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INTRODUCTION 
For approximately ten years beginning in the early 2000s and 
ending somewhat soon after the implementation of the America 
Invents Act (“AIA”) in 2011, all of the “water-cooler talk” was 
about the expanding patent market and increasing patent values. 
Since 2011, for business method and software patents, gene patents 
and medical diagnostic patents, and standard essential patents 
(“SEP”), the water cooler is no longer full of Kool-Aid and is 
viewed by some instead as a “glass-half-empty.” These types of 
patents currently hold a fraction of the transaction and enforce-
ment value they once were perceived to hold because of legislative, 
judicial, and other recent events to be highlighted in this Article. 
This phenomenon has resulted in a devaluation of these patent as-
sets in general, if even just because a chilling effect has restricted 
their owners’ ability—or willingness—to assert or transact for 
them in the current patent market environment. 
A number of large companies holding vast portfolios of these 
types of patents, or smaller companies relying on business model 
protection from smaller portfolios, are public companies with cor-
porate disclosure requirements. The requirements include an obli-
gation to disclose to shareholders and other potential investors the 
value of their assets, any known risks and liabilities, and other ma-
terial non-public information, including an ongoing obligation to 
update previously disclosed information. It is manifest that patents, 
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their use, and enforcement affect shareholder value.1 It should be 
manifest, then, that material changes to patent holdings, their usa-
bility, and enforceability, as well as known patent risks and license 
requirements, constitute information that shareholders need. It is 
not manifest, however, that companies are under any requirement 
to disclose this information to current and future investors, or that 
companies perceive any ethical or other obligation to provide more 
                                                                                                                            
1 See SANGJUN NAM & CHANGI NAM, THE IMPACT OF PATENT LITIGATION ON 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE IT INDUSTRY 3 (2012), http://econstor.eu/bitstream/ 
10419/72514/1/742699536.pdf [http://perma.cc/49TL-KK7P] (“Bhagat, Bizjak and 
Coles (1998), using an event study, showed that the wealth effect of patent litigation is 
negative for defendant firms and insignificant for plaintiff firms. Lerner (1995) 
investigated the wealth effect of patent litigation on biotechnology firms and found a 
negative effect on stock prices. Bessen and Meurer (2007) examined the negative impact 
of a patent lawsuit on shareholder value using a large sample based on the date of the 
filing of the lawsuit for US public firms from 1984 to 1999. The results showed that the 
patent litigation filing announcement has a negative effect on defendant firms, after 
controlling certain factors pertaining to firm characteristics.”). Patent-related events, 
including litigation, can have a serious impact on corporate health. See Abusive Patent 
Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and Potential Solutions: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 11 (2013); see also, e.g., Diomed Patent Defendant Files for Chapter 
11, BOS. BUS. J. (Jan. 22, 2008, 2:40 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/ 
mass-high-tech/2008/01/diomed-patent-defendant-files-for-chapter-11.html 
[http://perma.cc/2SG7-QW7Q] (reporting that Total Vein Solutions LLC, which 
Diomed sued for patent infringement in 2004, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection); Ameet Sachdev, Football Gear Maker Files for Bankruptcy After Losing Patent-
Infringement Suit, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-
09-14/business/ct-biz-0914-chicago-law-20100914_1_schutt-sports-riddell-patent 
[http://perma.cc/F9VC-B6TW] (noting that Schutt Sports Inc. filed for bankruptcy a 
month after it was hit with $29 million in damages for violating a rival’s patent). 
Additionally, studies have offered that, at least with regard to the S&P 500, most 
corporate value is tied to intangible assets. See Ocean Tomo’s Intangible Asset Market Value 
Study, OCEAN TOMO (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.oceantomo.com/2013/12/09/ 
Intangible-Asset-Market-Value-Study-Release/ [http://perma.cc/L3QJ-JWH5]. As 
Ocean Tomo’s Chairman James E. Malackowski explained: 
Within the last quarter century, the market value of the S&P 500 
companies has deviated greatly from their book value. This “value 
gap” indicates that physical and financial accountable assets reflected 
on a company’s balance sheet comprises less than 20% of the true 
value of the average firm . . . . Our further research shows that a 
significant portion of this intangible value is represented by patented 
technology. 
Id. 
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information about these assets or risks other than blanket and boi-
lerplate statements in their disclosures. 
This Article identifies the general devaluation and/or increased 
risk of invalidation of these types of patents only as an example of 
information that could be important to shareholders. It then de-
scribes the impact this devaluation and known patent liabilities 
could have on corporate value, presents the requirements for par-
ticular companies to disclose patent information to shareholders 
and policy reasons for strengthening these requirements, and pro-
poses that public companies could do more—or could be required 
to do more—to limit their risk and increase information transpa-
rency to investors. 
Part I of this Article outlines the recent events that have deva-
lued business method and software patents, gene and medical diag-
nostic patents, and SEPs. Part II utilizes filtered patent issuance 
and acquisition data to identify entities that have large or signifi-
cant holdings of such patents, and explains the impact these occur-
rences could have on these entities. Emphasis will additionally be 
given to particular acquisitions by public companies, especially 
those that were disclosed to investors either through a Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filing, press release, or public 
analyst call. Part III will describe the public disclosure require-
ments of public companies related to patent assets and the proce-
dures that must be taken to comply with those requirements. This 
Part will also discuss the policy reasons for carefully considering 
patent-related disclosures and justifications for requiring additional 
disclosures related to certain patent information, including poten-
tial patent risks and liabilities, such as known licensing obligations 
otherwise not discoverable by investors. Part IV will review the ac-
tivities of those entities identified in Part II to provide commentary 
on those activities in light of the requirements discussed in Part III. 
Part IV will conclude that current practices may not leave such 
companies susceptible to risk of statutory penalty or shareholder 
suit under current precedent and court interpretation of the re-
quirements. Yet, there are defensible reasons for requiring addi-
tional patent information disclosures to protect shareholders. Be-
cause shareholders are now “awakening” to the importance of pa-
2016] ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET PART II 421 
 
tent information, it may be best for both shareholders and corpora-
tions to increase the required disclosures. 
I. EMERGENCE OF A CONSTRICTED PATENT MARKET 
As I pointed out in a previous publication,2 four times more pa-
tent applications were filed in 2012 than in 1975.3 This resulted in 
an increased focus on intellectual property (“IP”) protection and 
enforcement, which is evidenced by the steady rise in patent litiga-
tion since 1990.4 Patent litigation saw an unprecedented thirty per-
cent increase in filings in 2012 to reach 5,000 patent suits filed in a 
year for the first time in history.5 The pattern of increased patent 
and litigation filings also drove new strategic activity in the patent 
market, highlighted by privateering and collaborative ventures 
meant to create anonymous network effects and third-party benefi-
ciary advantages to extract value.6 For example, in January 2012, 
wireless firm Adaptix sold more than 200 patents to patent licens-
                                                                                                                            
2 Ian D. McClure, Accountability in the Patent Market: A Duty to Monitor Patent Risk 
from the Boardroom, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 217, 218–19 (2015). 
3 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2014, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [http://perma. 
cc/VZ48-VJH9] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Utility patent application filings actually 
decreased in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1991, 1996, 2008, and 2009, but they continued their 
upward trajectory nonetheless. See Robert Sterne & Trevor Chaplick, Why Directors Must 
Take Responsibility for Intellectual Property, IAM MAG., Feb./Mar. 2005, at 16, 20 (“The 
role of IP in certain industry sectors was much less prominent a decade ago . . . . Today all 
industry sectors embrace IP.”). 
4 See id. 
5 2013 Patent Litigation Study, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2013), 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-
litigation-study.pdf [http://perma.cc/CJ8U-MP65]. 
6 In the absence of a central marketplace, third-party entities and syndicates, such as 
RPX Corporation, Allied Security Trust, LOT Network, and Intellectual Ventures, act as 
agents on behalf of market participants to provide access, anonymity, and collective 
network effects in the market. See generally ALLIED SECURITY TR., http://www.allied 
securitytrust.com [http://perma.cc/J23B-SVY6] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); INTELL. 
VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com [http://perma.cc/6DRH-DYRK] (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015); LOT NETWORK, http://www.lotnet.com/lotnet-solution/ 
index.cfm [http://perma.cc/2EMJ-4M4P] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); RPX CORP., 
http://www.rpxcorp.com [http://perma.cc/6BPA-4J4W] (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
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ing firm Acacia.7 In July 2012, Fujifilm sold 1,200 patents to patent 
licensing and technology firm Universal Display.8 On December 
16, 2013, Panasonic sold 900 patents to patent licensing firm Wi-
Lan, and on January 6, 2014, it sold 500 additional patents to pa-
tent licensing firm Inventergy.9 Nokia has sold its patents to vari-
ous licensing agent firms more than twenty times since 2008.10 
These represent just a fraction of the similar deals consummated in 
the past five years.11 Moreover, AT&T, among other companies, 
has developed webpages dedicated to offering certain of its patents 
for sale.12 To capture defensive value through a network effect, 
companies have signed up in large droves to join the memberships 
of companies such as RPX Corporation,13 Allied Security Trust,14 
or Unified Patents.15 A goal of all of these activities, it seems, is to 
maintain brand reputation by limiting identity discovery and blow-
back, while still generating monetary return and/or clearing the 
market of risk. 
For certain types of patents, however, the abovementioned pat-
tern has stopped. These include business method and software pa-
                                                                                                                            
7 See Ben Dummett, Acacia to Acquire Adaptix for $160 Million, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 
2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204409004577157470455118362 
[http://perma.cc/Z5N6-VGM4]. 
8 See FUJIFILM Corporation Sells Its Worldwide OLED Patent Portfolio to Universal 
Display Corporation for US$105 Million, FUJIFILM (July 24, 2012), http://www.fuji 
film.com/news/n120724.html [http://perma.cc/MW2W-WEZB]. 
9 Joff Wild, Panasonic Makes a Major Privateering Play as Japanese Companies Seek to 
Sweat Their Patents, IAM BLOG (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/ 
Detail.aspx?g=9375cbd5-7354-41fe-bd18-32a5d392bfde [http://perma.cc/UN6X-3SES]. 
10 Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters Against Apple, Google, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
01-11/patent-privateers-sail-the-legal-waters-against-apple-google [http://perma.cc/ 
J6A5-W7GU] (observing that Nokia has transferred its patents to privateers for licensing 
income more than twenty times since 2008). 
11 For example, Tynax is a full-service patent brokerage representing buyers or sellers 
in a variety of patent-related transactions and has tens of thousands of patents flagged as 
potentially available for sale on its market. Patent Brokering Services for Buyers and Sellers, 
TYNAX, http://www.tynax.com/services.php [http://perma.cc/KQ5S-U8SS] (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
12 See Patent Sales, AT&T, http://soc.att.com/1tOcQQB [http://perma.cc/H3DX-
NVW7] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
13 See generally RPX CORP., supra note 6. 
14 See generally ALLIED SECURITY TR., supra note 6. 
15 See generally UNIFIED PATENTS, http://unifiedpatents.com [http://perma.cc/V4 
TT-BRWZ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
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tents, gene patents, medical diagnostic patents, and SEPs. These 
types of patents have been devalued by a storm of events since 2011 
including new legislation and its impact, proposed legislation and 
its chilling effect, lobbying efforts and their narrative’s uptake, 
judicial opinions and their downstream application, and a signifi-
cant standard setting organization’s (“SSO”) patent policy 
changes. Specifically, the validity and enforceability of these types 
of patents have been limited by (1) the federal courts’ application 
of Supreme Court opinions in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Internation-
al,16 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,17 
and Mayo Collaborative Sources v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.;18 (2) the 
implementation of the AIA’s inter partes review (“IPR”) system;19 
(3) the proposed Innovation Act and other similar bills to reform 
patent eligibility and enforcement;20 (4) the efforts of “super-
coalition” lobbyist organizations such as United for Patent 
Reform;21 and (5) a string of court decisions determining a reason-
able and non-discriminatory (“RAND”) rate for licensing SEPs, 
capped by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ 
(“IEEE”) recent IP policy change heeding the calls of technology 
standard implementers to codify those decisions.22 The sudden 
impact on the validity and enforceability of these types of patents 
has, without question, negatively affected their value in the current 
environment in terms of transaction value and ability to exclude 
competitors from practicing those inventions. 
                                                                                                                            
16 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
17 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
18 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); see infra Part I.A. 
19 See infra Part I.B. 
20 Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015). Other bills will be discussed later in this 
Article, but a quick summary and link to these bills is provided by Patent Progress. Patent 
Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PAT. PROGRESS, http://www.patent 
progress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-
legislation/ [http://perma.cc/4FXQ-CKEP] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) [hereinafter 
Patent Progress Guide]. 
21 See Brian Fung, Patent Reform Advocates are Launching a ‘Super-coalition’ to Whack 
Patent Trolls, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/01/15/patent-reform-advocates-are-launching-a-super-coalition-to-
whack-patent-trolls/ [http://perma.cc/9K4S-HQVP]; see generally UNITED FOR PAT. 
REFORM, http://www.unitedforpatentreform.com/ [http://perma.cc/MJF2-R7BK] (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
22 See infra Part I.D. 
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A. The Supreme Court’s Holdings and Their Application by Lower 
Courts 
For nearly thirty years prior to 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court 
generally ignored cases involving patent subject matter eligibility. 
However, since 2010, the Court has made patent eligibility a focus 
with four different decisions.23 In Bilski v. Kappos and Alice, the 
Court focused on whether business or information processing me-
thods related to financial activities, such as hedging trading risk or 
transferring funds to and from intermediary accounts, were ab-
stract ideas or patentable subject matter.24 In Mayo, the Court fo-
cused on medical diagnostics and, in particular, whether a patent 
directed to drug-delivery methods that do nothing more than pro-
vide a method for deciding when to increase the provision of 
treatment is preempting the application of a law of nature or claim-
ing patentable subject matter.25 In Myriad, the Court decided that 
isolated human genetic sequences were not “new,” and thus not 
patentable.26 
While there has been much debate about whether the Court has 
set a clear precedent providing predictability or not with these cas-
es, a couple of things are very clear for abstract ideas and laws of 
nature: (1) after Alice, a patent that claims a basic economic or 
business norm but includes to “do it on a computer” or “do it on 
the Internet” is not patentable, and (2) after Mayo, a patent that is 
directed to a law of nature without specific inventive application 
and that preempts other unidentified applications is not patenta-
ble.27 As we have discovered in their wake, there are many more 
patents out there that U.S. courts believe fall within these catego-
ries. 
Despite the much-maligned coherence of its opinions, one 
thing is clear: the Supreme Court appears to believe its opinions all 
                                                                                                                            
23 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289; Bilski 
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
24 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2351; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 792. 
25 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
26 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2109. 
27 Jeffrey Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of 
Abstractions, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 647, 649–50 (2015). 
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fall in line with each other.28 Perhaps more importantly for the 
purpose of this Article is that the lower courts have applied these 
decisions with a very common outcome: broad invalidation of pa-
tents.29 Whether the precedent is coherent or not, the lower courts 
are taking a patchwork of the decisions that suits them to effectuate 
a desired outcome.30 The collective outcomes have, in aggregate, 
shifted a patent market towards an environment where such pa-
tents are presumed invalid instead of valid. The below two tables 
provided by Robert Sachs, writing for the BilskiBlog in January 
2015,31 demonstrate a clear picture of the aligned Federal Circuit 
and District Court activity in the six months following Alice: 
 
 Federal Circuit 
Decisions Patents Claims 
Not Invalid 1 1 27 
Invalid 6 12 34432 
 
 District Court 
Decisions Patents Claims 
Not Invalid 11 20 535 
Invalid 29 56 1,48833 
                                                                                                                            
28 Id. at 650. (“Moreover, while in other fields the Court readily acknowledges the 
disorder of its jurisprudence, over the last four decades, the Court has pretended that its 
subject-matter jurisprudence is a coherent whole.”). 
29 Robert Sachs, #Alicestorm: Patent Invalidations and USPTO Practice After Alice, 
BILSKIBLOG (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/01/alicestorm.html 
[http://perma.cc/MN8V-JFW2] (“Looking at the number of patents that have been 
invalidated in the six-plus months since the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank, the only thing that adequately describes the situation is #Alicestorm.”). 
30 Lefstin, supra note 27, at 650. 
31 Sachs, supra note 29. 
32 Id.; see, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 
1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test 
Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. 
App’x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 
2870 (2014). 
33 Sachs, supra note 29; see, e.g., Bascom Research, LLC v. LinkedIn, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 
3d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also, e.g., Card Verification Sols., LLC v. Citigroup Inc., No. 
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While business method patents have been invalidated the most 
(twenty-three patents), the below table shows the range of technol-
ogies affected during this six months:34 
 
Patent Type Number of Invalidated Patents 
3D computer animation 2 
Medical records 2 
Database architecture 2 
Networking 4 
Digital image management 7 
Document management 10 
 
It is clear that not just financial services-related patents have 
been affected, and lower courts have painted the Supreme Court’s 
“abstract ideas” holding in Alice with a broad brush across all 
technical fields.35 
B. The America Invents Act and Its Inter Partes Review Machine 
Like the lower courts, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”) has been equally as, if not more, effective at 
invalidating patents it believes should not have been issued in the 
first place.36 The below table demonstrates the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) activity during the same six-month pe-
riod following Alice:37 
 
 PTAB Decisions Patents Claims 
Not Invalid (decision) 2 2 38 
Invalid (decision) 8 8 151 
Likely invalid 
(institution) 28 28 135 
 
                                                                                                                            
13 C 6339, 2014 WL 4922524 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014); Cloud Satchel, LLC v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 553 (D. Del. 2014) . 
34 Sachs, supra note 29. 
35 Id. (“This suggests that the courts are aggressively expanding the zone of ‘abstract 
ideas’ from the fundamental ‘building blocks’ of ‘human ingenuity’ that the Supreme 
Court has focused on in Alice, to just about any technological field.”). 
36 See, e.g., id. 
37 Id. 
2016] ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET PART II 427 
 
In total, 2,732 IPRs have been filed since 2012.38 Of the 986 
filed in fiscal year 2015, the below table demonstrates the technolo-
gy break down:39 
 
Technology and Class Number of Petitions Percentage 
Electrical/Computer—TCs 
2100, 2400, 2600, 2800 625 63.4% 
Mechanical/Business 
Methods—TCs 3600, 3700 245 24.8% 
Chemical—TC 1700 36 3.7% 
Bio/Pharma—TC 1600 77 7.8% 
Design—TC 2900 3 0.3% 
 
The month that Alice was decided in June 2014, 184 IPRs were 
filed, the most of any month since the AIA was enacted.40 Accord-
ing to a study conducted by Brian Love and Shawn Ambwani, the 
PTAB has instituted a petition to challenge at least one claim on 
eighty-four percent of IPR filings, and for all challenged claims se-
venty-four percent of the time.41 There have been 322 final deci-
sions on the merits and 436 settlements through April 2015.42 As-
suming the same rate of results through mid-2014, more than se-
venty-seven percent of the final decisions have resulted in invalida-
tion or disclaimer of all challenged claims.43 
The effectiveness, if we can call it that, of the IPR system has 
been clear, but perhaps predictable, in light of the general senti-
ment about patent quality that has permeated the patent world and 
Congress during the same time frame. 
                                                                                                                            
38 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD: AIA 
PROGRESS (April 9, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_ 
statistics_04-09-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/CA7A-EGDM]. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 
81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 94 (2014). 
42 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 38. 
43 Love & Ambwani, supra note 41; cf. Scott McKeown, IPR Final Decisions Track 
Reexamination Outcomes, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.patents 
postgrant.com/ipr-final-decisions-two-year-retrospective [http://perma.cc/CM9B-
NEKL] (“A[ll] claims were cancelled in 45% of inter partes reexamination cases.”). 
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C. Proposed Legislation, Lobbying, and the Development of a General 
Anti-Patent Narrative 
The AIA was enacted, among other reasons, to fix an inefficient 
patent issuance system and provide additional channels for tech-
nology users and operating companies to challenge patents of ques-
tionable quality with less expense and time.44 It created the new 
IPR and Covered Business Method (“CBM”) procedures for pa-
tent challenges.45 In 2012 and early 2013, no one yet knew the ab-
ovementioned effectiveness of the IPR system, and certain lob-
byists felt that Congress had not gone far enough with the AIA.46 
On February 26, 2013, the Saving High-Tech Innovators from 
Egregious Legal Disputes (“SHIELD”) Act was introduced as 
what would be the first of many new patent reform bills offered to 
fix a purported abusive patent litigation problem.47 It was spon-
sored by Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR), along with Reps. Jason Chaf-
fetz (R-UT), Kerry Bentivolio (R-MI), Tim Walberg (R-MI), and 
Peter Welch (D-VT).48 A key to the SHIELD Act, and the senti-
ment behind it and other bills to follow, was that it: 
Direct[ed] courts making [a judgment of invalidity 
or noninfringement where the plaintiff is not the in-
ventor, an operating entity, or a university technol-
ogy transfer office] to award the recovery of full 
                                                                                                                            
44 President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate 
Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs, WHITE 
HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/ 
president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim 
[http://perma.cc/WZ9M-9HD9] (“[AIA] will give a boost to American companies and 
inventors who have suffered costly delays and unnecessary litigation, and let them focus 
instead on innovation and job creation . . . . The Patent and Trademark Office will offer 
entrepreneurs new ways to avoid litigation regarding patent validity, at costs significantly 
less expensive than going to court.”). 
45 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, RESPONSE TO PATENT TRIAL AND APPEALS 
BOARD: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON TRIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE AMERICA INVENTS 
ACT BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ip/boards/bpai/sas.pdf [http://perma.cc/7FXT-6XGK] (last visited Nov. 
2, 2015). 
46 See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Senate Bill Tips Scales for Patent Owners in AIA Reviews, 
LAW360 (June 5, 2015, 8:45 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/664373/senate-bill-
tips-scales-for-patent-owners-in-aia-reviews [http://perma.cc/UGC7-BGXZ]. 
47 See H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013–2014). 
48 Id. 
2016] ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET PART II 429 
 
costs to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or 
noninfringement, including reasonable attorney’s 
fees, other than the United States, unless excep-
tional circumstances make an award unjust.49 
In other words, it was intended to provide a chilling effect that, 
coupled with the line of court decisions and the “effectiveness” of 
the PTAB highlighted above, implicitly targeted those same classes 
of patents: abstract ideas related to business methods and software 
patents, laws of nature related to drug diagnostics and delivery, and 
gene patents. As if the trend of court decisions and PTAB results 
were not enough, certain lobbyist groups described below believed 
we needed to go further to effectuate the chilling effect, developing 
an incredibly strong anti-patent system narrative that focused on 
persuading anybody without knowledge that most of these patents, 
if not all, are invalid and are likely to be used in litigation in an ab-
usive manner. For the purpose of this Article, it is important to 
realize that this lobbyist effort has worked up a very believable and 
effective story.50 Since the SHIELD Act, thirteen additional such 
bills were introduced during the 113th Congress, involving scores 
of legislators attempting to make it their issue:51 
 Innovation Act (H.R. 3309); 
 Patent Transparency and Improvements Act (S. 
1720); 
 Patent Quality Improvement Act (S. 866); 
 Patent Abuse Reduction Act (S. 1013); 
 Patent Litigation Integrity Act (S. 1612); 
 Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act (S. 
2049); 
 Patent Fee Integrity Act (S. 2146); 
 Trade Protection Not Troll Protection Act 
(H.R. 4763); 
                                                                                                                            
49 Id. 
50 See Gene Quinn, Will Congress be Misled on Patent Reform Again?, IP WATCHDOG 
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/05/will-congress-be-misled-on-
patent-reform-again/id=53021/ [http://perma.cc/77NB-7DVS]. But see Tom Risen, How 
the Tech Lobby Got Beat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.us 
news.com/news/articles/2014/09/16/how-the-tech-lobby-got-beat 
[http://perma.cc/Q2ZK-26EM]. 
51 See Patent Progress Guide, supra note 20. 
430 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:417 
 
 Demand Letter Transparency Act (H.R. 3540); 
 Innovation Protection Act (H.R. 3309); 
 Patent Litigation and Innovation Act (H.R. 
2639); 
 Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act 
(STOP Act) (H.R. 2766); and 
 End Anonymous Patents Act (H.R. 2024). 
Two additional bills have been introduced thus far during the 
114th Congress; a revamped Innovation Act (H.R. 9) and the 
Strong Act (S. 632), the first bill proposed by an opposition group 
that perceives the pendulum to have swung too far as a result of the 
activities described above.52 According to Patent Progress, a web-
site dedicated to following the progress of such bills, the focus of 
the majority of these bills includes (1) making the CBM review 
program available to more industries than just financial services, 
(2) curbing “abusive litigation tactics,” (3) protecting end-users, 
and (4) adding transparency to identify third-party beneficiaries of 
litigation and suppliers of patents and financing to non-practicing 
entities (“NPE”).53 From my perspective, all of this boils down to 
three main intended results: (1) leveraging the judicial and PTAB 
sentimentality and environment with respect to those identified 
classes of patents to make it still easier to invalidate them; (2) de-
veloping an even stronger chilling effect to discourage even at-
tempts at asserting or extracting value from these patents that, like 
all other patents, are presumed valid from issuance; and (3) render-
ing the value of these patents in the transaction market to be signif-
icantly reduced or eliminated as a result of third-party beneficiary 
transparency rules and the special treatment of NPEs to remove a 
large component of liquidity from the market.54 All of this creates a 
chilling effect on these classes of patents, in filing for them, trans-
acting for them, or asserting them, which has been evidenced in 
2014 in part by a lower rate of increase in patent application filings 
and fewer year-over-year litigation filings.55 
                                                                                                                            
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Gene Quinn, Sharp Decline in US Patent Litigation So Far in 2014, IP WATCHDOG 
(Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/10/sharp-decline-in-us-patent-
litigation-so-far-in-2014/id=48442/ [http://perma.cc/73F6-CQ3X] (“The obvious 
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The lobbying effort behind this new patent reform push is led 
by Silicon Valley Internet-based juggernauts Google, Facebook, 
and Adobe, and supported by large corporate members of the res-
taurant, hotel and retail industry, such as JCPenney and Macy’s.56 
They have developed a narrative summarized by a message read on 
the homepage of their group, United for Patent Reform’s website: 
“American businesses large and small across many industries are 
being held hostage by patent trolls. This must change.”57 The ef-
fort has pushed literature and data evidencing purportedly abusive 
patent litigation, a significant portion of which has taken place in 
the technical areas that are the focus of this Article.58 The largest 
piece of marketing behind this group’s agenda has seemed to be a 
study and article by James Bessen and Michael Meurer claiming 
that assertions made and patent lawsuits filed by NPEs have caused 
the economy $29 billion in direct costs.59 Without regard for the 
accuracy or legitimacy of the Bessen and Meurer study and ar-
ticle,60 it is important, for the purposes of this Article, to under-
                                                                                                                            
question this leads to is whether the patent litigation centric patent reforms presenting 
[sic] pending in the Congress are required if the number of patent infringement cases 
being brought is declining.”); see also Lisa Shuchman, Fewer Patent Litigation Filings So 
Far in 2014, CORP. COUNS., Oct. 14, 2014. There were only about one percent more 
patent applications filed in 2014 than in 2013, whereas the previous year-on-year increase 
had been more than five percent. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–
2014, supra note 3. The rate of increased filings in 2014 was the lowest since 2009. See id. 
56 Fung, supra note 21. 
57 UNITED FOR PAT. REFORM, supra note 21. 
58 See, e.g., Michael Loney, US Patent Litigation Surges in February, Driven by Software 
Cases, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 1 (2015), http://www.unitedforpatentreform.com/files/ 
mip_us_litigation_update_april_2015271373446.pdf [http://perma.cc/HFW3-R6L8] 
(explaining that litigation is up over 2014, despite 2014 being a relatively down year for 
litigation filings, as evidenced above, and noting that the numbers are still down compared 
to 2013). 
59 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs of NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 387, 389 (2014). 
60 See David Schwartz & Jay Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the 
Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014); see also Adam Mossoff, Junk Science Still 
Front and Center in Push to Weaken Patents, HILL (Feb. 13, 2015), http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/congress-blog/technology/232699-junk-science-still-front-and-center-in-push-to-
weaken-patents [http://perma.cc/8AD9-Q5Y4]; Gene Quinn, Patent Reformers Resort to 
Misrepresentations in WSJ Op-Ed, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.ipwatch 
dog.com/2015/02/17/patent-reformers-resort-to-misrepresentations-in-wsj-op-
ed/id=54863/ [http://perma.cc/8Z3Q-L8BF]; Joff Wild, Deconstructing Bessen and 
Meurer—Paper Raises Big Questions over Their NPE Claims, IAM BLOG (July 27, 2012), 
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stand that these and other similar efforts have caused fifteen patent 
reform bills since 2013.61 All of these bills aim to make it more diffi-
cult to enforce and transact certain patents otherwise enjoying a 
presumption of validity, especially those patents owned by certain 
types of entities and patents in the subject classes that are the focus 
of this Article.62 This phenomenon perpetuates a chilling effect on 
the enforceability of these patents, as their cause has been heeded 
by courts and patent owners. Until there is certainty about what 
will be the law, and as long as there is optimism that some form of 
these bills will be passed, users of these patents are not willing to 
transact, eliminating the monetizable value of these patents with-
out litigation.63 
D. Standard Essential Patents and the Decreasing RAND Value 
Another class of patents has been devalued recently by a string 
of decisions by federal courts. Additionally, one of the largest SSOs 
in the world has joined the campaign and recently decided to 
change its IP policy in a manner that puts owners of SEPs at a dis-
advantage to their counterparty in any licensing negotiation.64 SEPs 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.iam-media.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=454c1adc-52c3-4c2d-8981-e4716361f219 
[http://perma.cc/65LC-L4VE]. 
61 See Patent Progress Guide, supra note 20. 
62 See James E. Bessen, What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling—For Now, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/what-
the-courts-did-to-curb-patent-trollingfor-now/383138/?single_page=true 
[http://perma.cc/V8CS-UZKK] (“While it’s true that the Patent Office is granting 
several hundred fewer business method patents each month, it is still granting record 
numbers of software patents overall. Most of the litigation is over software patents, not 
just business method patents.”); see also Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Impact of Alice on 
Business Method Patents, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 2, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2014/12/patent-business-method-patents.html [http://perma.cc/UZ7A-NUNB] (“The 
point here, according to Bessen is that, although the Supreme Court has done some work, 
there is still plenty of room for Congressional action to further reduce or eliminate patents 
covering software.”). 
63 See, e.g., Corporate Announcement, Intellectual Property Exchange Intl., Inc. (Mar. 
23, 2015) (on file with author) (expressing that with respect to its licensing programs, 
licensees refused to transact or even negotiate when IPXI declined to litigate); see also Joff 
Wild, IPXI Demise Caused by a US Patent System That Offers No Incentive for Good-faith 
Licensing, Says Exchange’s CEO, IAM BLOG (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.iam-media.com/ 
blog/Detail.aspx?g=93e8d407-b24c-4d9a-a59c-da9fe9e3f578 [http://perma.cc/N3M6-
JXUU]. 
64 William C. Powell, Will New IEEE Standards Policy Devalue Standards Essential 
Patents?, BAKER HOSTETLER (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/will-new-
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have widely been regarded as having automatic value because they 
claim a technology that is incorporated into a technology protocol 
that is adopted by an entire industry, and patent owners have his-
torically desired to own SEPs because they can extract royalties 
more easily.65 Some research has shown that the value of any single 
SEP may be tied to the owner of the patent, as well as the number 
of patents essential to the same standard that are owned and of-
fered for license by that same entity.66 Regardless of these and oth-
er factors in determining the value of each SEP, no factor is more 
important than whether they are encumbered by a contractual 
commitment to license under RAND terms. Many SSOs, like the 
IEEE, include a contractual commitment with membership that 
obligates each member to license their essential patents to all enti-
ties demanding a license in a reasonable and non-discriminatory 
manner.67 To be complete, the IEEE includes four options for each 
member ranging between open-source licensing without compensa-
tion to the most commonly chosen option—a member will make a 
license available for its essential patent claims “‘under reasonable 
rates, with reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably 
free of any unfair discrimination,’” to an unrestricted number of 
applicants for uses implementing the standard (the “RAND Com-
mitment”).68 Prior to its recent IP policy change described in more 
detail below in this Article, the IEEE has previously not defined or 
                                                                                                                            
ieee-standards-policy-devalue-standards-essential-patents [http://perma.cc/C4Z3-
5YYM] (“The new IEEE policy may reduce the licensing value of patents that are 
essential to implement a product compliant with future IEEE standards.”). 
65 Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents 2 (Harvard Bus. School, 
Working Paper No. 14-038, Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication% 
20Files/14-038_c030ca39-5339-4447-b952-8132110260bf.pdf [http://perma.cc/4UEV-
8BRX] (“Intellectual property (IP) owners vie to have their technologies incorporated 
into standards, so as to collect royalty revenues . . . .”). 
66 Peter Quies, Valuing Standard Essential Patents: An Examination of Announced 
Royalty Rates for LTE Patents, MICRONOMICS (Dec. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees/intellectual/012413-valuing-
standard-essential-patents-memo.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/B58L-5W8W]. 
67 See INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, INC., IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.2 
(Dec. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/J3P4-G9XM]. 
68 See Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., to Michael A. Lindsay, 
Esq. (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/02/ 
311470.pdf [http://perma.cc/M5HP-6SBP]. 
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offered help to define what “reasonable terms” or “conditions that 
are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination” actually means. 
Before this Article describes the IEEE policy change, it is im-
portant to understand the driving force behind the IEEE’s deci-
sion. Over the past four years, the value of SEPs and the meaning 
of the RAND Commitment have been hotly contested through 
lawsuits. Given the opportunity, and without benchmarks for me-
thodology or valuation, courts have taken it upon themselves to 
determine RAND royalty rates and the proper approach to take in 
that determination.69 As a result, these rates have decreased signif-
icantly over the last few years.70 The primary decisions since 2012 
involve wireless standards and include Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola 
                                                                                                                            
69 Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Determining RAND Royalty Rates for 
Standard Essential Patents, 29 ANTITRUST 86, 86 (2014) (“SSOs generally have left these 
questions unanswered for various reasons, including not wanting to be responsible for 
policing patent licensing terms . . . . The appropriate definition of RAND and appropriate 
approaches for determining a RAND royalty are the subject of litigation between SEP 
owners and product manufacturers in various venues around the world.”). 
70 Kat Greene, Calif. Jury Sets RAND Rate for Licensing Wi-Fi Patents, LAW360 (Feb. 
27, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/514100/calif-jury-sets-rand-rate-
for-licensing-wi-fi-patents [http://perma.cc/CA2B-4XJ5] (“‘Not only is this the first trial 
in which district court jurors have determined the RAND rate for a patent, we believe 
these royalties are the lowest ever to be set for comparable technologies related to 
declared standard-essential patents,’ Steven S. Baik, attorney for Realtek, said . . . .”); see 
Royalty Rates for Standard Essential Patents, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Royalty_Rates_for_
Standard_Essential_Patents_414F.pdf [http://perma.cc/S4QN-6BH3] (“[T]he amount 
of the RAND royalty was substantially less than 1% of the rate that Motorola had 
originally sought . . . . Judge Robart’s decision in Microsoft v. Motorola is the first to set out 
and apply a methodology for determining a RAND royalty rate for standard-essential 
patents. As such, it is likely to be at least addressed if not followed by other trial 
courts . . . to the extent that it can be read to limit the royalty available for a standard-
essential patent subject to a RAND commitment . . . Judge Robart’s decision may well 
affect the valuation of such patents in the secondary market. Parties considering the 
purchase or sale of standard-essential patents subject to a RAND commitment should 
carefully consider Judge Robart’s decision in evaluating the likely return on their 
investment.”); see also Roger Brooks, SSO Rules, Standardization, and SEP Licensing: 
Economic Questions from the Trenches, Remarks prepared for the Research Roundtable on 
Innovation and Technology Standards, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic 
Growth, Northwestern University School of Law, (Feb. 7–8, 2013) (“[C]umulative 
royalties for new entrants . . . have actually proven to be lower for 3G handsets than for 
handsets introduced under the 2G GSM standard.”). 
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Inc.,71 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC,72 and Realtek Semiconductor 
Corp. v. LSI Corp.73 These courts seriously considered royalty 
stacking and patent hold-up arguments by technology implemen-
ters, including by amicus brief.74 Although their methodologies 
were a bit different, it is generally noted that these findings have 
devalued SEPs by setting a low benchmark for RAND rates in all 
contexts.75 These decisions come subsequent to very large damages 
calculations and settlement figures from other assertions of SEPs 
related to wireless standards by entities such as Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (“CSIRO”), an 
Australian national laboratory, and Wi-Lan.76 As a result, for pa-
tents like SEPs where the largest component of value is the poten-
tial royalty stream they may generate, these federal court decisions 
have significantly devalued these patents from their potential royal-
ty position enjoyed not even five years ago.77 
                                                                                                                            
71 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 25, 2013). 
72 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
73 Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451 RMW, 2012 WL 
4845628 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012). 
74 See, e.g., In re Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217. 
75 See Leonard & Lopez, supra note 69. 
76 See Mark Summerfield, The Story Behind CSIRO’s Wi-Fi Patent ‘Windfall,’ 
PATENTOLOGY (Apr. 5, 2012, 2:03 AM), http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/04/story-
behind-csiros-wi-fi-patent.html [http://perma.cc/9UHU-X8FW] (noting that CSIRO has 
collected over $420 million from one SEP prior to 2012). Compare Ben Grubb, CSIRO’s 
Wi-Fi Patent Victory Earns $200m and Counting, CRN (Oct. 15, 2009, 9:11 AM), 
http://www.crn.com.au/News/158194,csiros-wi-fi-patent-victory-earns-200m-and-
counting.aspx [http://perma.cc/FF5D-4RJ5] (showing that fourteen CSIRO settlements 
occurred in or prior to 2009 for a total $200 million, equaling an average of approximately 
$14 million per settlement for one patent), with Mark Chandler, Innovatio Case: Victory for 
Cisco Customers Makes the Case for Patent Reform, CISCO BLOGS (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:48 AM), 
http://blogs.cisco.com/news/innovatio-case-victory-for-cisco-customers-makes-the-
case-for-patent-reform [http://perma.cc/8VAB-VDB6] (explaining that Innovatio IP 
Services, LLC (also an NPE) only collected $2.7 million from Cisco in a settlement for 
nineteen SEPs that were similarly identified to be within the “top 10%” of technologies 
with respect to importance to the 802.11n standard). The main difference between these 
settlements is that the Microsoft and In re Innovatio decisions had come down, decreasing 
the RAND rate for SEPs in general. 
77 Leonard & Lopez, supra note 69 (“In the case of a patent for which the primary 
driver of value is licensing, the expected future cash flows are the royalty revenues minus 
the incremental costs of efforts to license the patent. Thus, for such patents, including 
SEPs where the patent owner has made a commitment to license on RAND terms, there 
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In February 2015, the IEEE heeded these decisions, the argu-
ments being made by technology implementers that make up a 
large portion of its membership, and a call to define RAND by the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Federal Trade Commission, and 
European Commission was initiated.78 The IEEE announced that 
its board had approved an IPR policy change that, among other 
things, limits the definition of “reasonable rate” to a “smallest sal-
able compliant implementation” and further limits the availability 
of an SEP owner to obtain an injunction.79 It also limits the rate to 
the entire stack of patents held by that SEP owner applicable to the 
licensee’s product.80 This policy change, although endorsed by the 
DOJ as potentially having procompetitive effects, should decrease 
the potential royalty stream for all SEPs related to IEEE standards, 
as an injunction will no longer be scary to licensees (a large motiva-
tor for device “original equipment manufacturers” to license with-
out litigation), and the general bargaining position balance between 
SEP owners and technology implementers has now been shifted 
heavily in favor of the implementers.81 What is clear is that SEPs, 
once having significant potential to earn a reasonable return on re-
search investment, are now worth a fraction of that value because 
                                                                                                                            
should be a close relationship between a patent’s value and the size of the royalty stream 
it is expected to generate.”). 
78 See Kaie-Uwe Kuhn, Fiona Scott Mortion & Howard Shelanski, Standard Setting 
Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 1, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/ 
assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar-13Special.pdf [http://perma.cc/22FL-4MJ5]. 
79 See IEEE Statement Regarding Updating of Its Standards-Related Patent Policy, IEEE 
(Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.ieee.org/about/news/2015/8_february_2015.html 
[http://perma.cc/N7PP-HCHH]; see also Powell, supra note 64 (noting that “[t]he prior 
policy largely left ‘reasonable rate’ undefined, and it could have been based, for example, 
on a percentage of an entire product containing the compliant implementation rather than 
the smallest salable compliant implementation”). 
80 Id. 
81 See Susan Decker & Ian King, Qualcomm Says It Won’t Follow New Rules on Patents, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 11, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2015-02-11/qualcomm-says-new-wi-fi-standard-rules-unfair-may-not-take-part 
[http://perma.cc/RZ3C-SSPY]; see also Letter from Lawrence F. Shay to David Law, 
Patent Committee Chair, (Mar. 24, 2015), http://wpuploads.interdigital.com.s3.amazon 
aws.com/uploads/2015/03/Letter-to-IEEE-SA-PatCom.pdf [http://perma.cc/3HS9-
YA2X]. 
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of the trend of court decisions since 2012 and the recent IEEE IP 
policy change that could spur other SSOs to follow suit.82 
II. A LOOK AT THE PATENT LANDSCAPE: DEVALUED 
PATENTS AND LICENSING OBLIGATIONS 
In order to identify companies holding patents that may be sus-
ceptible to the general devaluation described in Part I, I looked at 
two types of data: (1) acquisition data, to determine which compa-
nies had recently, but prior to important devaluation events, ac-
quired similar assets, and (2) patent assignment data, to determine 
generally which companies own the most patents that are similar to 
those that are susceptible to devaluation. To define “patents sus-
ceptible to devaluation,” for business method and software patents 
and medical diagnostic and gene patents, I targeted only patents in 
the same Cooperative Patent Classification (“CPC”) as those pa-
tents that were invalidated in Alice (CPC G06Q), Mayo (CPC 
A61K), and Myriad (CPC C07K). To find acquisition data for these 
types of patents, I used filtered data and analytics from 2011–2014 
from TerraCaptus, LLC, a patent auction, consulting and data 
firm, using its proprietary data engine.83 To find general assign-
ment data, I used the Innography patent data tool and searched by 
CPC class.84 For SEPs, I used a research report, the Sunlight Re-
port, that has been accepted by at least one federal court as identi-
fying the entire potential “stack” of patents for IEEE 802.11.85 
                                                                                                                            
82 Vin Gurrieri, AIPLA Rip Landmark RAND Ruling in 9th Circ., LAW360 (Sept. 23, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/580211/qualcomm-aipla-rip-landmark-rand-
ruling-in-9th-circ [http://perma.cc/QEK2-3ZF9] (“Qualcomm Inc. and the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association told the Ninth Circuit Monday that a Washington 
federal judge used a flawed methodology to determine royalty rates in a suit between 
Motorola Inc. and Microsoft Corp. that, if endorsed, could devalue all standard-essential 
patents.”); see Powell, supra note 64. 
83 See TERRACAPTUS, http://terracaptus.com/ [http://perma.cc/4QXE-NK4D] (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
84 See INNOGRAPHY, https://www.innography.com [http://perma.cc/WEF2-GKMX] 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
85 SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A., TECH. PAT. REP., 802.11n WLAN (on 
file with author). This report provides a panoramic claims-level analysis of issued United 
States patents that may relate to IEEE 802.11n standard for wireless local area networks. 
Id. The report provides an Intellectual Property Rights landscape and identifies, among 
other things, the distribution of patent holdings and the major competitors in the field. Id; 
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Based on essentiality evaluation of a sample of more than one hun-
dred patents in the Sunlight Report, I found an attrition rate of ap-
proximately fifty percent. 
Using this information, I found that, between 2011–2014, the 
following companies acquired the most patents in the subject CPCs 
after AIA and prior to Alice, Mayo, or Myriad, respectively: 
 
CPC A61K 
Company Name 
Number of 1,338 Total Pre-Mayo 
Transactions Between 2011–2012 
Novartis  125 
Roche86  104 
Abbvie Inc. 49 
Pfizer 19 
Astrazeneca 19 
 
CPC C07K 
Company Name 
Number of 309 Total Pre-Myriad 
Transactions Between 2011–2013 
Roche 55 
Novartis 29 
Abbvie Inc. 21 
Medimmune87 11 
Abbott 4 
                                                                                                                            
see In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*42–43 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Dr. Lynde relied on another report by Sunlight 
Research and concluded that there are 3,266 patents aside from Innovatio’s patents that 
are potentially essential to the 802.11 standard. Taking into account all of the evidence 
and Judge Robart’s findings on this question, the court determines that the PA Report’s 
number of approximately 3,000 is a credible account of the number of potentially 
standard-essential patents. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that all of those 
approximately 3,000 potentially essential patents are in fact essential.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
86 Roche is only listed on the SIX Swiss Exchange. See Roche Holding AG, SWISS 
EXCHANGE, http://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/shares/security_info_en.html?id=CH 
0012032048CHF1 [http://perma.cc/83TY-AADG] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
87 MedImmune is wholly owned by AstraZeneca. See generally MEDIMMUNE, 
https://www.medimmune.com [http://perma.cc/VWH5-KH8F] (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015). 
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CPC G06Q 
Company Name 
Number of 336 Total Pre-Alice 
Transactions Between 2011–2014 
Accenture 28 
eBay 23 
Western Union 9 
Facebook 6 
Roche 5 
 
The following demonstrates the companies that are currently 
assigned the most patents within each of the CPCs, without regard 
for (1) whether those patents were acquired or granted to the assig-
nee and (2) when the patent was issued or assigned to the assignee: 
 
CPC A61K 
Company Name Number of Patents 
Isis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 164 
Merck & Co. Inc. 157 
Nektar Therapeutics 113 
Johnson & Johnson 110 
Roche Holding Ltd. 109 
Sanofi SA 106 
Novartis AG 105 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. 82 
Eli Lilly & Co. 67 
Amgen, Inc. 65 
 
CPC C07K 
Company Name Number of Patents 
Roche Holding Ltd. 735 
Merck & Co. Inc. 177 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 166 
GlaxoSmithKline plc 150 
Novartis AG 134 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. 133 
Astellas Pharma, Inc. 128 
Amgen, Inc. 119 
Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd. 105 
Johnson & Johnson 98 
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CPC G06Q 
Company Name Number of Patents 
IBM 1,899 
Microsoft Corporation 1,102 
SAP SE 1,032 
Google 637 
Oracle Corporation 528 
AT&T Inc. 453 
Amazon.com, Inc. 450 
Hewlett-Packard Company 398 
eBay Inc. 371 
Accenture Plc 361 
Bank of America Corporation 357 
 
Based on data provided by the Sunlight Research Report, the 
following are the ten companies holding the most patents that are 
potentially essential to the IEEE 802.11n standard:88 
 
IEEE 802.11n Number of Patents 
Qualcomm, Inc. 1,519 
Intel Corporation 923 
Samsung Group 854 
Interdigital, Inc. 824 
Broadcom Corporation 491 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson 383 
Panasonic Corporation 371 
Nokia Corporation 354 
Alcatel-Lucent 319 
Sony Corporation 294 
 
This representation does not mean that all, or any, of these pa-
tents are invalid or essential. The patents are, however, subject to 
much higher scrutiny in the past three years and, as a result, are 
much more difficult to enforce or transact. The reduced enforcea-
bility of these patents renders their value decreased, both in the 
                                                                                                                            
88 SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A., supra note 85. 
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context of enforcing to protect products or for transacting in the 
patent market.89 The purpose of showing the information above is 
to demonstrate that, because these patents are encumbered by a 
chilling effect, a limited enforceability, and/or an increased risk of 
invalidation, at the least, the public companies that own them could 
be sharing more information about them to shareholders or poten-
tial investors. For example, Google’s 637 patents in the Alice CPC 
makes up nearly 2.5% of all of its granted patents.90 Similar to the 
online advertising patent that was invalidated by the Federal Cir-
cuit recently in Ultramercial v. Hulu,91 what if proprietary and im-
portant search algorithms and online advertising methods invented 
by Google and relied upon to maintain competitive advantage over 
competitor search engines are found in this batch of 637 patents? 
Should that be something that investors need to know? Similarly, 
Qualcomm makes most of its profits from licensing standard essen-
tial patents.92 Should it disclose to investors that its SEPs would 
earn lower royalties in the future? 
                                                                                                                            
89 See Louis Carbonneau, Toxic Asset: The Gradual Demise of the American Patent, IP 
WATCHDOG (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/12/10/toxic-asset-the-
gradual-demise-of-the-american-patent/id=52571/ [http://perma.cc/UMU9-MRYH] 
(“Recently, we have been witnessing the gradual erosion of our patent system, which 
culminated last week with a decision in Ultramercial v. Hulu by the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit; looking at the same patent for the third time (yes, really), the court 
reversed itself from a previous finding of validity and declared a patent related to Internet 
advertising to be invalid, based on the recent Supreme Court in Alice . . . . All of these 
decisions have collectively made it harder for patent owners to: i) maintain the validity of 
duly issued patents (previously presumed by law), ii) pursue infringement claims, iii) 
prove damages (let alone treble damages), iv) have open discussions with potential 
infringers prior to litigating, and have left the unsuccessful patent owner at risks of paying 
millions in legal fees to the other side if the judges so decides.”). 
90 Per Innography, Google owns 27,449 issued patents as of April 15, 2015. See Search 
Performed Using Innography (on file with author). 
91 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated sub 
nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014). 
92 See Noel Randewich, Qualcomm’s Quarterly Revenue Growth Dwindles, Shares Fall, 
REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-
qualcomm-results-idUSBREA3M1WU20140423 [http://perma.cc/442V-79ZX]. 
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III. CORPORATE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: THEIR 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
Boards of directors of all corporations have fiduciary duties 
owed to the shareholders of the organization that are governed by 
the laws of the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated.93 Since 
the early 2000s, however, additional disclosure requirements for 
public companies have been codified in federal law in response to 
financial, accounting, and other ethical scandals that have caused 
harm to investors.94 For companies listed on either the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or the Nasdaq Global Market 
(“NASDAQ”), the following are some of the rules and regulations 
imposed on boards and their committees: 
 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended 
(“SOX”);95 
 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as 
amended (the “Exchange Act”);96 
 rules of the SEC; 
 the corporate governance listing standards of the 
NYSE and NASDAQ; and 
 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-
Frank”).97 
For the purpose of this Article, we will focus on requirements 
under the Exchange Act and SOX, which primarily govern the on-
                                                                                                                            
93 Requirements for Public Company Boards, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Chart_of_Board_Requirements_December_
2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ZCW-UX6S]. 
94 Id. 
95 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 
29 U.S.C.). 
96 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp). 
97 Pub. L. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.); see 
also Requirements for Public Company Boards, supra note 93; SEC Disclosure Laws and 
Regulations, INC. MAG., http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/sec-disclosure-laws-and-
regulations.html [http://perma.cc/79VR-U6MY] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“For 
example, in 2000 the SEC imposed new regulations to eliminate the practice of ‘selective 
disclosure,’ in which business leaders provided earnings estimates and other vital 
information to analysts and large institutional shareholders before informing smaller 
investors and the rest of the general public.”). 
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going disclosure of information to shareholders and potential inves-
tors related to the assets and activities of the company. 
A. Disclosures Required Under the Exchange Act and SOX 
The three primary SEC filings for a public company include 
Form 10-K, an annual filing; Form 10-Q, a quarterly filing; and  
Form 8-K, a filing triggered by certain circumstances or material 
events.98 In either case, public companies are required to disclose 
significant information to investors on a regular basis.99 Form 10-K 
is one of two annual reports prepared by a public company.100 
While Form 10-K is filed with the SEC and governed solely by fed-
eral statute, an annual report is also prepared for distribution di-
rectly to shareholders, by direct mail and by placement on the 
company website.101 The annual report for shareholders has histor-
ically enjoyed less regulation, but the SEC has begun to control the 
content in annual reports more closely.102 The SEC offers the fol-
lowing clarity in distinguishing between the annual report on Form 
10-K and the annual report prepared for distribution to sharehold-
ers: 
The annual report to shareholders is a document 
used by most public companies to disclose corporate 
information to their shareholders. It is usually a 
state-of-the-company report, including an opening 
letter from the Chief Executive Officer, financial da-
ta, results of operations, market segment informa-
tion, new product plans, subsidiary activities, and 
research and development activities on future pro-
grams. Reporting companies must send annual re-
ports to their shareholders when they hold annual 
meetings to elect directors. Under the proxy rules, 
reporting companies are required to post their proxy 
                                                                                                                            
98 Fast Answers, Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/form10k.htm [http://perma.cc/Z35L-5QU6] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 SEC Disclosure Laws and Regulations, supra note 97. 
102 Id. 
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materials, including their annual reports, on their 
company websites. 
The annual report on Form 10-K, which must be 
filed with the SEC, may contain more detailed in-
formation about the company’s financial condition 
than the annual report and will include the annual 
financial statements of the company. Companies 
sometimes elect to send their annual report on 
Form 10-K to their shareholders in lieu of, or in ad-
dition to, providing shareholders with a separate 
annual report to shareholders.103 
The annual Form 10-K and quarterly Form 10-Q require a pub-
lic company to disclose, among other things, audited financial 
statements and evidence of controls and processes for information 
reporting.104 The financial statements must include information 
about total assets and long-term obligations.105 In addition, they 
must include “risk factors” or “information about the most signif-
icant risks that apply to the company or to its securities.”106 The 
goal of these disclosure requirements is to provide transparency to 
investors and potential investors about the business operations, fi-
nancial condition, management, and business and legal risks of the 
corporation.107 As the SEC has stated: 
[A]ll investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts 
about an investment prior to buying it, and so long 
as they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires 
public companies to disclose meaningful financial 
and other information to the public. This provides a 
common pool of knowledge for all investors to use 
                                                                                                                            
103 Annual Report, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
annrep.htm [http://perma.cc/VXD5-QN9F] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
104 ERNST & YOUNG, 2011 SEC ANNUAL REPORTS—FORM 10-K (2011), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/SECAnnualReports10K_CC0337_Nove
mber2011/$FILE/SECAnnualReports10K_CC0337_November2011.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7G9P-6C8L]. 
105 SEC Disclosure Laws and Regulations, supra note 97. 
106 How to Read a 10-K, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/reada10k.htm [http://perma.cc/QK2Z-6FYB]. 
107 See id. 
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to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold 
a particular security. Only through the steady flow 
of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information 
can people make sound investment decisions. 
The result of this information flow is a far more 
active, efficient, and transparent capital market that 
facilitates the capital formation so important to our 
nation’s economy . . . .108 
Accountability is not limited to the corporation, but also ex-
tends to the board and executives themselves. For example, section 
906 of SOX requires the chief executive officer and chief financial 
officer to provide a certification accompanying each periodic re-
port, stating, among other things, that the report fully complies 
with the requirements of sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange 
Act.109 Section 906 provides for criminal penalties for an officer 
who knowingly provides a false certification, including harsher pe-
nalties for willful violations.110 
Form 8-K serves the purpose of a time-sensitive and ongoing 
requirement to disclose information triggered by significant corpo-
rate events and circumstances. Examples of significant events or 
circumstances requiring disclosure that could be potentially rele-
vant to patent-related information include: 
 Item 2.01—Completion of Acquisition or 
Disposition of Assets, which requires disclosure 
if a company, “or any of its majority-owned 
subsidiaries[, has acquired or disposed] of a 
significant amount of assets, otherwise than in 
the ordinary course of business.” Item 2.01 
includes a bright-line reporting threshold that a 
company need only report a completed 
acquisition or disposition of assets if the 
transaction meets the significant asset test, 
which deems an acquisition or disposition is 
                                                                                                                            
108 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [http://perma.cc/7NQU-MEAP]. 
109 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1850. 
110 Id. 
446 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:417 
 
deemed significant if (1) the company’s “and its 
other subsidiaries’ equity in the net book value 
of [the] assets or the amount paid or received for 
the assets . . . exceeded 10% of the total assets of 
the [company] and its consolidated 
subsidiaries[,]” or (2) the transaction involved a 
business that is significant under Regulation S-
X.111 
 Item 2.02—Results of Operations and Financial 
Condition, which includes public 
announcements or releases of “material non-
public information regarding [a company’s] 
results of operations or financial 
condition . . . .”112 
 Item 2.03—Creation of a Direct Financial 
Obligation or an Obligation under an Off-
Balance Sheet Arrangement of a Registrant.113 
 Item 2.06—Material Impairments, including a 
disclosure when a company’s “board of 
directors, a committee of the board of directors, 
or [an authorized] officer or officers of the 
[company] . . . if board action is not required, 
concludes that a material charge for impairment 
to one or more of its assets, including, without 
limitation, [an impairment] of securities or 
goodwill, is required under generally accepted 
accounting principles applicable to the 
[company].” The company must disclose: (a) 
the date of the conclusion that a material charge 
is required and describe the impaired asset or 
assets and the facts and circumstances leading to 
the conclusion that the charge for impairment is 
                                                                                                                            
111 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K, at 6–7, https://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/form8-k.pdf [http://perma.cc/G29N-F6SE] (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) 
[hereinafter FORM 8-K]; see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HOW 
TO READ AN 8-K (May 2012), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/readan8k.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/DZM5-79N4]. 
112 FORM 8-K, supra note 111, at 7. 
113 Id. at 8. 
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required; (b) the company’s estimate of the 
amount or range of amounts of the impairment 
charge; and (c) the company’s estimate of the 
amount or range of amounts of the impairment 
charge that will result in future cash 
expenditures.114 
 Item 4.02—Non-Reliance on Previously Issued 
Financial Statements or a Related Audit Report 
or Completed Interim Review.115 
 Item 8.01—Other Events, under which “the 
registrant may, at its option, disclose under this 
Item 8.01 any events, with respect to which 
information is not otherwise called for by this 
form, that the registrant deems of importance to 
security holders.”116 
Importantly, for this Article, the SEC periodically expands the 
list of items requiring disclosure on Form 8-K and changes the pe-
riod of time within which a Form 8-K must be filed.117 
B. Materiality is the Key 
Whether a public company is required to disclose certain in-
formation in a Form 8-K filing often depends on the significance, 
or materiality, of the event or information. Materiality has been 
defined by the Supreme Court as “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea-
sonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”118 More recently, in Matrixx Initia-
tives, Inc. v. Siracusano,119 the Supreme Court clarified that there is 
no “bright-line” test requiring “statistical significance,” and that 
any undisclosed information—statistically measurable or other-
                                                                                                                            
114 Id. at 11. 
115 Id. at 13. 
116 Id. at 21. 
117 Edward M. Welch, Frequently Asked Questions About Form 8-K, MORRISON & 
FOERSTER (2015), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQ-Form-8-K.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/BE2G-WVH7]. 
118 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries v. Northway, 
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
119 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011). 
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wise—that would “significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of informa-
tion made available” in the eyes of a reasonable investor could well 
be material.120 In a case where the company has made some disclo-
sure, this includes an evaluation of the connection between the 
company’s actual statement and the quality and nature of the in-
formation about adverse events that is omitted.121 
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., the Court considered whether a 
plaintiff bringing a securities fraud claim under the Exchange Act 
section 10(b)2 and SEC Rule 10b-53 must show that a pharmaceut-
ical company’s undisclosed adverse event reports are statistically 
significant.122 The Court unanimously decided that statistical signi-
ficance is not required, but “[s]omething more” is.123 Because the 
Court did not provide any guidance on what “something more” 
may be, some authors have commented that the decision “may in-
itiate unnecessary disclosures of non-material information, hinder-
ing an investor’s informed decision-making.”124 
Others have stated that, for corporations, deciding what to dis-
close is “one of the most difficult determinations. And it’s going to 
remain[] that way . . . I think the Supreme Court decision [in Ma-
trixx Initiatives] is saying, ‘Go out there and struggle, and best of 
luck for the next few years.’”125 
C. Scienter is a Key 
It should be noted here that scienter is generally required to 
prove securities fraud under the disclosure requirements, and SOX 
certifications do not permit an inference of scienter.126 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                            
120 Id. at 43–44. 
121 See Erik J. Olson, Stephen Thau & Stefan J. Szpajda, In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano, the United States Supreme Court Reaffirms That Materiality Depends on a 
Contextual Analysis of What a Defendant Says, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110322-Securities-Fraud.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/S2K7-98JL]. 
122 Matrixx Initiatives, 563 U.S. at 30. 
123 Id. at 44. 
124 Marcie Brecher, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: Nasal Spray Decision Throws 
Corporations off the Scent of “Materiality” Definition, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. PROXY 1, 1–2 
(2012). 
125 Id. at 11–12 (internal citations omitted). 
126 See Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 555 
(5th Cir. 2007). 
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because of the heightened pleadings standard of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), most security fraud litiga-
tion fails at the scienter stage.127 Courts have held that an inference 
of scienter is only proper “if the person signing the certification 
had reason to know, or should have suspected, due to the presence 
of glaring account irregularities or other ‘red flags,’ that the finan-
cial statements contained material misstatements or omissions.”128 
Predictably, then, “red flags” are where a corporation should begin 
to determine what is “material” for reporting purposes, because 
knowledge of information and its materiality is also generally re-
quired. Essentially red flags are “those facts which come to the at-
tention of an auditor which would place a reasonable auditor on 
notice that the audited company was engaged in wrongdoing to the 
detriment of its investors.”129 A “red flag” must be something 
more than just an incidental accounting violation.130 Red flags in-
clude untrue or misleading statements and drastic overstatement of 
financials or forecasted projections.131 
Two things seem to be in common between material corporate 
information generally required to be disclosed on a Form 8-K and a 
company’s patent information, including a portfolio’s value and 
enforceability as well as known licensing obligations. First, as the 
next Part will demonstrate, shareholder value and investor deci-
sions are impacted by both, and investors want and need the infor-
mation but have a hard time getting it.132 Second, as the next Part 
                                                                                                                            
127 See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that investors’ securities fraud claims required pleading of individual, not 
collective, scienter); Indiana Elec. Workers’ Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., 
Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 545 (5th Cir. 2008); Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 
1236 (11th Cir. 2008). 
128 See Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006). 
129 Id. at 1268 (citing In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1334 (M.D. 
Fla. 2002)). 
130 In re Spear & Jackson Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (citing 
Holmes v. Baker, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2001)). 
131 See Garfield, 466 F.3d at 1267–68. 
132 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/ 
05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definition-of-material/ [http://perma.cc/B2HC-
HKHZ] (“Why all the secrecy? It seems that each day brings a new revelation of a 
company tardily disclosing something important. Goldman Sachs was slow to disclose 
that there was an investigation into the Abacus transaction; Goldman, as well as Procter 
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will also demonstrate, more information is known by corporations 
than is disclosed to shareholders.133 Whether this knowledge meets 
the scienter standard or not, corporations likely make a conscious 
decision not to take on unnecessary risk by making additional pa-
tent-related disclosures. Certainly, there are good reasons for this 
that will be discussed in the next Part of this Article. Still, there are 
good policy reasons why this information, or at least more informa-
tion than is currently being disclosed, should be provided to share-
holders and potential investors. Corporations should recognize that 
shareholders are becoming much more knowledgeable about the 
impact that patent events have on the value of their equity, and this 
will eventually lead to a debate, and lawsuits, about the disparity of 
information that is known by corporations and disclosed to inves-
tors.134 I believe that the information highlighted in Part I of this 
                                                                                                                            
& Gamble and AMR, all said nothing when one of their directors, Rajat K. Gupta, became 
ensnared in the Galleon Group insider trading investigation. There is the debate about 
what Apple should say publicly about Steve Jobs’s health. Most recently, Berkshire 
Hathaway said a senior executive, David L. Sokol, had bought shares of a company before 
that company was acquired by Berskshire—a revelation it made only when it announced 
Mr. Sokol’s resignation. It is all a matter of materiality . . . . It’s here where companies 
have gotten into trouble. A company’s disclosure of controversial information is run past 
the lawyers, who look at it through a legal perspective. Since materiality is a legal concept 
to them, the lawyers too often find ways to judge it not material. It’s not directly related 
to the business (Mr. Jobs), no official allegations have been made (Mr. Gupta) or it’s not 
relevant to judging business performance (Abacus).”). 
133 Id. (“This is the problem with the current disclosure scheme and its definition of 
materiality. It is increasingly disconnected from the desires of investors and the 
marketplace. Investors live in a digital world of real-time communication. Information is a 
commodity whose value rapidly deteriorates—the faster a company discloses, the better, 
from an investor’s perspective. The definition of materiality is from the 1980s, another 
time. Companies have not kept up and too often view disclosure as a game, with the goal 
to avoid disclosure.”). 
134 See Joe Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short 
the Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-
kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408 [http://perma.cc/6FAA-
UTVS]; see also Bruce Berman, Battle Between Tessera and Activist IP Investor is Heating 
Up, IP CLOSE UP (May 9, 2013), https://ipcloseup.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/battle-
between-tessera-and-activist-ip-investor-is-heating-up/ [http://perma.cc/C9LU-EUEF] 
(“Activist investors have been around for decades. Carl Icahn, among others, have made 
them famous (or is that infamous?), and many shareholders rich. Icahn, as you may recall, 
put pressure on Motorola to sell its patents, before the entire company was sold to Google 
for $12.5 billion. Starboard has brought the challenge of higher value to businesses with 
significant IP holdings. It played an important role in the AOL’s $1.05 billion portfolio 
sale to Microsoft, which was in turn partially sold to Facebook.”); Shareholder Activism: 
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Article is only an example of the type of information that investors 
may desire and that corporations should consider providing. As a 
result, this leaves corporations and investors with a need to more 
clearly define materiality as it relates to patent information. As 
shareholders become increasingly concerned with patents and their 
impact on investment, companies should err on the side of precau-
tion so as to avoid having to “[g]o out there and struggle.”135 In 
addition, the investor perspective and interests should also be con-
sidered in determining what needs to be disclosed. As another au-
thor has offered: “For investors’ sake, companies need to view ma-
teriality from a broader perspective. It is not just about whether the 
SEC could bring an action, but what investors will find impor-
tant—in other words, will it move the market price?”136 
IV. THE CURRENT DISCLOSURE ENVIRONMENT: PATENT 
INFORMATION AND PUBLIC COMPANIES 
As an overarching statement that will be fleshed out in this 
Part, public companies don’t disclose much, if anything, to share-
holders about their patents, patent portfolio value, or patent risk. A 
review of the SEC filings, press releases and transcripts of investor 
analyst conference calls made by some of the companies identified 
in Part II of this Article found that those entities disclosed very lit-
tle or no information about the acquired assets, at the time of the 
assignment or since. One such public company, Pandora, made a 
statement about the cost of its acquisition ($8 million) on an inves-
tor conference call.137 
                                                                                                                            
Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-
unlikely-heroes [http://perma.cc/V3Q6-JLS9]. 
135 Brecher, supra note 124, at 1–2. 
136 Solomon, supra note 132. 
137 Ben Sisario, Ad Revenue from Mobile for Pandora Increases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/business/media/ad-revenue-from-mobile-
for-pandora-increases.html [http://perma.cc/LGT2-CSUN] (“In a conference call with 
journalists and investors, Pandora announced that it had recently spent $8 million on ‘a 
broad patent portfolio’ from Yahoo.”). 
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A. Form 10-Ks and Patent Information 
To provide additional color on the situation with actual exam-
ples that differ greatly in the amount of information disclosed, a 
review of Form 10-K filings from three public companies—Avaya, 
Google, and General Electric—is discussed in the order of most 
information disclosed to the least information disclosed. 
Avaya, in its Form 10-K filed on September 30, 2011, regarding 
its patent holdings, stated the following: 
As of September 30, 2011, we had approximately 
5,600 patents and pending patent applications, in-
cluding foreign counterparts . . . . 
Our intellectual property holdings include those as-
signed to us by Lucent Technologies (now Alcatel-
Lucent) at Avaya’s inception, which included a num-
ber of patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets 
and other intellectual property directly related to 
and important to our business. Lucent and its subsid-
iaries also granted certain rights and licenses to specified 
patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and other 
intellectual property needed for the manufacture, use 
and sale of our products. Rights to these patents were 
granted through a cross license entered into with Lucent. 
In addition, Lucent conveyed to Avaya numerous li-
censes and sublicenses under patents of third parties. 
We will obtain patents and other intellectual 
property rights used in connection with our business 
when practicable and appropriate. Historically, we 
have done so organically or through commercial re-
lationships as well as in connection with acquisi-
tions, including the acquisition of NES. For example, 
in the acquisition of NES, we acquired over 800 patents 
and patent applications and were licensed a significant 
number of patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets 
and other intellectual property.138 
                                                                                                                            
138 Avaya Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Avaya 
2011 Annual Report] (emphasis added). 
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Compare the above to Avaya’s Form 10-K filed September 30, 
2014. Regarding its patent holdings, Avaya stated the following: 
As of September 30, 2014, we had approximately 
5,400 patents and pending patent applications, in-
cluding foreign counterpart patents and foreign ap-
plications. Our patents and pending patent applica-
tions cover a wide range of products and services 
involving a variety of technologies, including, but 
not limited to, unified communications (including 
video, social media, telephony and messaging), con-
tact centers, wireless communications and network-
ing. The durations of our patents are determined by 
the laws of the country of issuance. For the U.S., 
patents may be 17 years from the date of issuance of 
the patent or 20 years from the date of its filing, de-
pending upon when the patent application was filed. 
In addition, we hold numerous trademarks, both in 
the U.S. and in other countries. 
We will obtain patents and other intellectual proper-
ty rights used in connection with our business when prac-
ticable and appropriate. Historically, we have done so 
organically or through commercial relationships as well 
as in connection with acquisitions.139 
Noticeably, Avaya does not disclose any information in its 2014 
Form 10-K about licenses it has received from other entities, which 
is a difference from its 2011 Form 10-K in which it discloses that it 
received licenses to Lucent Technologies’ patents and third-party 
patents.140 Likewise, the 2014 Form 10-K doesn’t include any in-
formation about patent acquisitions.141 The omission means either 
(a) Avaya received licenses or acquired patents in 2013–2014 that it 
believed were not material, or (b) Avaya did not receive any li-
censes or acquire any patents. 
                                                                                                                            
139 Avaya Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 19 (Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Avaya 
2014 Annual Report] (emphasis added). 
140 See generally id.; see Avaya 2011 Annual Report, supra note 138, at 20. 
141 See generally Avaya 2014 Annual Report, supra note 139. 
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In its 2011 Form 10-K, Avaya stated the following regarding pa-
tent-related risks: 
From time to time, assertions of infringement of certain 
patents or other intellectual property rights of others 
have been made against us. In addition, certain pend-
ing claims are in various stages of litigation. Based on 
industry practice, we believe that any licenses or other 
rights that might be necessary for us to continue with our 
current business could be obtained on commercially rea-
sonable terms. However, we cannot assure you that any 
of those licenses or other rights will always be available 
on acceptable terms or that litigation will not occur. The 
failure to obtain necessary licenses or other rights, 
or litigation arising out of such claims, could ad-
versely affect our business. 
For more information concerning the risks re-
lated to patents, trademarks and other intellectual 
property, please see . . . “Risk Factors—Risks Re-
lated to Our Business—We may be subject to litigation 
and infringement claims, which could cause us to incur 
significant expenses or prevent us from selling our prod-
ucts or services.”142 
Compare the above quotation with Avaya’s 2014 Form 10-K, in 
which it stated the following regarding license obligations and other 
patent risks: 
We also have licenses to intellectual property for the 
manufacture, use and sale of our products. 
. . . . 
We are dependent on our intellectual property. If we 
are not able to protect our proprietary rights or if 
those rights are invalidated or circumvented, our busi-
ness may be adversely affected. We may be subject to 
litigation and infringement claims, which could 
cause us to incur significant expenses or prevent us 
from selling our products or services. 
                                                                                                                            
142 Avaya 2011 Annual Report, supra note 138, at 20 (emphasis added). 
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. . . [N]or can assurances be made that any of our 
patents, patent applications or our other intellectual 
property or proprietary rights will not be challenged, in-
validated or circumvented . . . . Patent litigation and 
other challenges to our patents and other proprie-
tary rights are costly and unpredictable and may 
prevent us from marketing and selling a product in a 
particular geographic area. If we are unable to pro-
tect our proprietary rights, we may be at a disadvan-
tage to others who did not incur the substantial time 
and expense we incurred to create our products.143 
The noticeable addition in 2014 is with regard to a general sus-
ceptibility to patent challenges or invalidations that could affect the 
business. Although only a general statement, this information is 
seemingly more relevant, or material, in 2014 than in 2011, given 
the trend of activities highlighted in Part I.144 Avaya is more direct 
about the channels through which it intends or does obtain patent 
rights, and that they do not rely solely on its own organic efforts. 
Similarly, Avaya adds that while it believes it can obtain licenses it 
needs under reasonable terms, it cannot promise that to inves-
tors.145 While this level of detail may not be what investors need or 
desire, in comparison to other public companies this is actually a 
lot of information. 
Compare Avaya’s Forms 10-K with that of Google. Google did 
not provide as much information about its own patent portfolio as 
does Avaya, such as the number of patents it holds.146 Instead, 
Google offered the following as it relates to its own patents: 
Our patents, trademarks, trade secrets, copyrights, 
and other intellectual property rights are important 
assets for us. Various events outside of our control pose 
a threat to our intellectual property rights, as well as to 
our products, services and technologies. For example, 
effective intellectual property protection may not be 
                                                                                                                            
143 Avaya 2014 Annual Report, supra note 139, at 19–23 (emphasis added). 
144 See supra Part I. 
145 See Avaya 2014 Annual Report, supra note 139, at 19. 
146 See Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10–11 (Feb. 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
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available in every country in which our products and 
services are distributed or made available through 
the Internet. Also, the efforts we have taken to protect 
our proprietary rights may not be sufficient or effec-
tive.147 
Noticeably, Google did not offer any information about the 
manner in which it grows or intends to grow its portfolio, whether 
it relies solely on organic growth or acquisition.148 Moreover, 
Google did not provide any information about licenses or acquisi-
tions, despite the fact that we know they have been very active in 
that manner.149 Regarding patent risks and licensing obligations, 
Google offered a bit more transparency: 
New laws and regulations (or new interpretations of 
existing laws and regulations) may also impact our 
business. For example, current and new patent laws 
such as U.S. patent laws and European patent laws may 
affect the ability of companies, including us, to protect 
their innovations and defend against claims of patent 
infringement. The costs of compliance with these 
laws and regulations are high and are likely to in-
crease in the future. 
. . . . 
. . . [P]atent holding companies may continue to 
seek to monetize patents they have purchased or 
otherwise obtained. As we have grown, the intellec-
tual property rights claims against us have increased 
and may continue to increase as we develop new 
products, services, and technologies. 
                                                                                                                            
147 Id. at 11. 
148 See id. at 10–11. 
149 See id.; see also Antonio Regalado, Google’s Growing Patent Stockpile, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/521946/googles-
growing-patent-stockpile/ [http://perma.cc/8KL5-U7LD] (“Last year, in its largest 
acquisition ever, Google spent $12.5 billion to buy Motorola Mobility, mostly to grab its 
trove of 17,000 patents and 7,000 patent applications. It has also purchased more than a 
thousand patents from IBM and picked up others from telephone companies and auto 
parts makers.”); Tom Simonite, Google’s Troubled Search for Valuable Patents, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/425678/googles-
troubled-search-for-valuable-patents/ [http://perma.cc/B7E8-RUNF]. 
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We have had patent, copyright, and trademark in-
fringement lawsuits filed against us claiming that cer-
tain of our products, services, and technologies infringe 
the intellectual property rights of others . . . . Adverse re-
sults in any of these lawsuits may include awards of sub-
stantial monetary damages, costly royalty or licensing 
agreements (if licenses are available at all) . . . . 
. . . . 
Although we seek to obtain patent protection for 
our innovations, it is possible we may not be able to 
protect some of these innovations. Moreover, we 
may not have adequate patent or copyright protection for 
certain innovations that later turn out to be important. 
Furthermore, there is always the possibility, despite our 
efforts, that the scope of the protection gained will be in-
sufficient or that an issued patent may be deemed 
invalid or unenforceable.150 
One omission of note, compared to Avaya, is that Google fails 
to mention a need or potential need to license patents, or that it 
believes reasonable licensing terms may always be obtainable.151 
Recall that Avaya offered that it “[has] licenses to intellectual 
property for the manufacture, use and sale of our products” and it 
“believe[s] that any licenses or other rights that might be necessary 
for us to continue with our current business could be obtained on 
commercially reasonable terms.”152 Google, on the other hand, 
provides no disclosure about licenses it has obtained or may need 
to continue its business.153 It only references a need to pay money 
for use of third-party patent rights in the context of an adverse 
judgment in a lawsuit or other claim against them.154 
                                                                                                                            
150 See Google Inc., supra note 146, at 10–11 (emphasis added). Despite recognizing “the 
costs of compliance with these laws and regulations are high and are likely to increase in 
the future,” Google does not mention the hefty costs it has itself spent to lobby patent law 
changes which directly affect the ability to enforce patents based on the identity of the 
patent holder or type of patent. See id. 
151 See id. 
152 Avaya 2011 Annual Report, supra note 138, at 20. 
153 See Google Inc., supra note 146. 
154 See id. at 13. 
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Compare Avaya and Google’s disclosures with that of General 
Electric. In its Form 10-K filed on June 30, 2014, General Electric 
only mentions patents while listing its “Intangible Assets subject to 
Amortization,” and even then it is titled “patents and technology” 
generally.155 There is no mention of the company’s dependence 
upon patented technology or obligations or potential risks related 
to licensing third-party patents or invalidation of its own patents.156 
B. Form 8-Ks and Patent Information 
As discussed in Part III, the questions of whether information 
should be disclosed in a Form 8-K generally involves a determina-
tion of materiality of the information or event, and the risk of hav-
ing to endure a securities fraud allegation also depends on whether 
the officers that signed off on certain disclosures knew or should 
have known that they were omitting certain material information. 
The materiality of patent information and whether an investor 
would consider it to change the “total mix” of information it needs 
or has depends a lot on how important patents really are to the val-
ue of a company. A determination about information specific to 
certain patents only, however, would likely be a case-by-case de-
termination that includes factors such as (a) the number of total 
patents held by the company and the number of patents that are 
relevant to the information, and (b) the importance or relevance of 
the patents in question to the core business operations of the com-
pany. Under the language of Item 2.01 of Form 8-K—Completion 
of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets of the Company—most pa-
tent acquisitions or sales by a company as large as and with a patent 
portfolio the size of IBM will likely not meet the ten percent of as-
sets threshold.157 For example, even if all of IBM’s 1,899 patents in 
CPC G06Q were invalid, which they are not, it would not come 
close to equaling ten percent of its assets, or even its patent as-
sets.158 However, since the value of all patents are not equal, and 
the value of any particular patent to a company can be critical (con-
                                                                                                                            
155 Gen. Elec. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 167 (June 30, 2014). 
156 Id. 
157 FORM 8-K, supra note 111, at 6–7. 
158 According to Innography, IBM has 94,260 granted U.S. patents as of April 17, 2015. 
See Search Performed Using Innography (on file with author). 
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sider Apple’s “swipe-to-unlock” patent), such an acquisition or 
disposition event should not be based solely on the number of pa-
tents. 
Consider Item 2.02 of Form 8-K and its requirement to dis-
close “material non-public information.”159 Assuming that we 
would be able to determine that the hypothetical invalidation of 
1,899 IBM patents would be material information, the next ques-
tion is whether their susceptibility to invalidation, or even to a re-
duced enforceability, is already public information or information 
that IBM knows but would not dare tell anyone else. The Alice de-
cision is public, as is all of the literature discussing its impact on 
software, information processing business method patents.160 
However, IBM’s patent holdings that are particularly susceptible 
to invalidation or a lack of enforceability as a result of the ruling 
and the current IPR environment is not readily accessible informa-
tion. I was able to determine that IBM had 1,899 patents in the 
Alice CPC, but I did so using Innography, a software tool that is not 
free or cheap. Further, only IBM patent experts, and not the public 
or potential investors, know which of its patents within this group 
are particularly valuable or to be relied upon for current or future 
business operations. If IBM has promoted a new product or soft-
ware, and that product or software relies on patent protection from 
a patent that is now more susceptible to invalidation because of re-
cent court rulings or the current IPR environment, should that be 
information disclosed to shareholders or potential investors? 
With regard to knowledge and the scienter element, consider 
information related to licensing obligations and patent risk. As it 
relates to director fiduciary duties to monitor patent risk taking, I 
have already proposed that a higher accountability to shareholders 
may be worthwhile for both the corporation and the shareholder.161 
As demonstrated in this Part, not all companies disclose patent li-
censing obligations. However, many companies know they have 
potential licensing obligations that are only unmaterialized at the 
moment because the patent owner has not asserted the patents or 
offered a license yet. For example, as demonstrated in this Part, 
                                                                                                                            
159 FORM 8-K, supra note 111, at 7. 
160 See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 89. 
161 See McClure, supra note 2. 
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there are thousands of patents that are essential to the IEEE 
802.11n standard. If we take just the patents at issue in the In re In-
novatio case, nineteen essential patents, which were determined 
essential to the standard by Judge Holderman, any company that 
produces or sells 802.11n compliant products and which is unli-
censed under the patents—directly or by exhaustion—knows it has 
a patent risk and potential licensing obligation related to these pa-
tents. Indeed, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLP filed a new case against 
public company Marvell (NASDAQ: MRVL) on March 16, 2015.162 
When the patents were determined essential by Judge Holderman 
in 2013, should Marvell—who knows it makes 802.11n compliant 
products163—have disclosed the fact that it was infringing these 
patents without a license and that it could have a license obligation 
in the future? The importance of the information to potential in-
vestors and shareholders is undoubtedly critical. After all, when a 
federal jury in Pittsburgh ordered Marvell to pay a $1.17 billion 
award for infringing Carnegie Mellon patents covering integrated 
circuits in 2013, Marvell’s stock price fell to its lowest point of 
$6.98 per share, resulting in an approximate market capitalization 
of around $3.4 billion dollars—half of what it is today.164 License 
information is also not available to investors, as only Marvell knows 
which patents it holds a license to and which it does not. Executed 
licenses are typically confidential, and publicly stating that a com-
pany does not hold licenses to the patents it is likely infringing pos-
es obvious risks that would be enough to drive any attorney up the 
wall. But the answer cannot just be that investors get the short end 
of the stick, can it? Marvell could rely on the fact that the essential-
ity of the Innovatio patents and the compliance of its products with 
                                                                                                                            
162 See Stephen R. Freeland, Innovatio Files Three New SEP Cases Against WiFi Chip 
Manufacturers, ESSENTIAL PAT. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.essentialpatent 
blog.com/2015/03/innovatio-files-three-new-sep-cases-against-wifi-chip-manufacturers/ 
[http://perma.cc/YA2C-SLGY]. 
163 Marvell Announces Industry’s First 802.11n 450 Mbps Solution for Highest Wi-Fi 
Throughput and Extended Range, MARVELL (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www.marvell.com/ 
products/wireless/wi-fi_450mbps_802.11n/release/972/ [http://perma.cc/8KLE-
N6FD] (“Compliant with the 802.11n specification, the new Marvell TopDog 11n-450 chip 
also offers . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
164 See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL 
1320154, at *15–16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 807 F.3d 1283 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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the 802.11n standard are both public pieces of information, and in-
vestors should put this information together to assume there could 
be a licensing obligation if Marvell is not licensed. The “could” 
and “if” of that determination, however, were incredibly expensive 
bets to be on the wrong side of in Marvell’s loss against Carnegie 
Mellon. 
The formula for determining materiality and what is “non-
public” related to any patent information is not clear, nor do I be-
lieve it could be proscribed by a bright-line-rule. What is clear, 
however, is that more information than what is currently being of-
fered is owed to investors and should be required by statute or the 
courts. The main reason for this is twofold: (1) patent information 
is important, if not critical, to accurate investment decisions, and 
(2) most patent information is not easily obtainable by shareholders 
and, in many cases, is not obtainable at all. 
C. Patent Information is Important to Shareholders 
In general, empirical studies have proven that patent informa-
tion such as patent litigation events do affect shareholder value.165 
Other studies have offered that as much as eighty percent of corpo-
rate value may be attributable to intangible assets.166 The Marvell 
example already highlighted in this example puts it in perspec-
tive—a public company stock that hit an all-time low as a result of a 
patent litigation loss, when information known by Marvell and not 
disclosed to investors could have prevented the bath that some in-
vestors had to take. The importance of information related to the 
potential devaluation of a patent portfolio, however, cannot be a 
“one-size-fits-all” determination. For small pharmaceutical or bio-
tech companies that rely on one or a few families of patents for ex-
clusive rights to build market share, the devaluation of a portfolio is 
a significant event. If, for example, the investors of Acorda Thera-
peutics (NASDAQ: ACOR) could have been given some warning 
that their patent was susceptible to invalidation before activist 
shareholder Kyle Bass filed his IPR, it could have saved them sig-
                                                                                                                            
165 See NAM & NAM, supra note 1. 
166 Ocean Tomo’s Intangible Asset Market Value Study, supra note 1. 
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nificant money. Share prices fell almost ten percent following the 
IPR filing.167 
D. Important Patent Information is Not Available to Shareholders 
To guard against rampant securities fraud allegations and pro-
tect business judgment decisions, courts have established an inter-
pretation of the scienter pleading requirement that is “the most 
demanding in the country.”168 This heightened standard has its 
merits. The question becomes this: as it relates to patent informa-
tion such as knowledge of patent infringement, where do we draw 
the line between a risk preventative business strategy and a con-
scious decision not to disclose important information to investors? 
Patent licensing information is not available to shareholders, and so 
they could never know for sure if a company has a patent infringe-
ment risk or not. Similarly, the importance of certain patents to 
current and future business prospects, as well as the potential for 
certain patents to be invalid, is information that experts inside of a 
company know and (not without good reason) do not disclose pub-
licly. 
                                                                                                                            
167 Julia La Roche, Kyle Bass’ War Against the US Pharmaceutical Industry Has Officially 
Begun, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/kyle-bass-files-
first-ipr-petition-2015-2 [http://perma.cc/6RLJ-A47D]. 
168 In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.1999); see also Berger v. 
Ludwick, C-97-0728-CAL, 2000 WL 1262646, at *3, *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2000), aff’d, 
15 Fed. Appx. 528 (9th Cir. 2001); George A. Markel & Francis S. Chlapowski, Life After 
Silicon Graphics: Will the PSLRA be Enforced?, 1151 PRAC. L. INST. 809, 813 (1999). 
